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Recent research has suggested that the reduction of entry regulation can promote firm entry and job
creation, but little is known about the quality of firms and jobs created through these reforms. To shed
light on this question, we employ data from Portugal, a country which implemented one of the most
dramatic and thorough policies of entry deregulation in the industrialized world. The impact of these
major changes can be traced with a matched employer-employee database that provides unusually
rich information on the quality of founders and employees associated with the new firms. Our assessment
indicates that the short term consequences of the reform were just as one would predict with a standard
economic model of entrepreneurship: The reform resulted in increased firm formation and employment,
but mostly among "marginal firms" that would have been most readily deterred by existing heavy
entry regulations. These marginal firms were typically small, owned by relatively poorly-educated
entrepreneurs, operating in the low-tech sector (agriculture, construction, and retail trade). These firms
were also less likely to survive their first two years than comparable firms that entered prior to the
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Do burdensome entry requirements hamper the creation of new ￿rms and stand in the
way of economic growth? There are solid theoretical reasons to believe that government-
imposed ￿xed costs to ￿rm formation deter entrepreneurship and reduce labor demand.
Two important strands of empirical work suggest that existing barriers have economically
important e￿ects in practice.
One set of analyses is based on cross-country comparisons. These papers compare coun-
tries in terms of the stringency of entry regulation, and ask if that variation is correlated with
measures of economic performance. For instance, in an in￿uential paper, Djankov, La Porta,
Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) establish that the o￿cial costs of business entry are
extremely high in many countries, and they show that onerous entry regulation is associated
with higher corruption and a higher concentration of activity in the informal sector. They
￿nd no evidence to suggest that high entry costs create value through improved quality of
either publicly or privately provided goods. Many subsequent papers have used similar em-
pirical strategies to evaluate the impact of the regulation of business entry, suggesting that
such regulation is associated with reduced job creation (Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2007),
higher industry concentration (Fisman and Sarria-Allende, 2004; Klapper et al., 2006), and
reduced entry of new ￿rms (Klapper et al., 2006; Dreher and Gassebner, 2007; Ciccone and
Papaioannou, 2007; Bjłrnskov and Foss, 2008) 1.
Of course, empirical work that relies on cross-national correlations leaves researchers with
a di￿cult inference problem￿an issue that receives an extended and insightful discussion in
the original work of Djankov et al. (2002). While it is important to know that heavy entry
regulation is associated with poor economic performance within countries, that correlation
alone is not su￿cient to assess the likely consequence of regulation reform in practice. After
all, as Djankov et al. (2002) demonstrate, countries with heavy entry regulation also are less
likely to have ￿good government￿ along a number of dimensions. One might be concerned, for
instance, that entry regulation reform, on its own, would have limited success in a country
with other deep structural economic and political problems.
As an alternative to cross-country analyses, a second complementary literature seeks to
directly assess the consequences of policies that reduce ￿rm entry costs using time-, region-
and/or industry-speci￿c variation in entry costs created by policy changes within particular
countries. Bertrand and Kramarz (2002), for example, carefully evaluate entry barriers
in France’s retail industry. That paper presents evidence that stronger entry deterrence
increased industry concentration and reduced employment growth. A second prominent
example is the work by Aghion et al. (2008), which shows that the dismantling of the License
Raj in India (a system of central controls that regulated entry and output expansion) resulted
in industry growth, but did so in ways that were tied to other features of the states in which
1More generally, to date nearly 200 academic articles have utilized either the original Djankov et al. (2002)
data set or updated versions published by the World Bank, as part of the World Bank’s Doing Business
Project, which tracks regulatory reforms in 181 countries. The World Bank indicators are widely used. For
example, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, set up by the United States to channel aid to developing
countries, uses these and similar indicators to screen applicants for U.S. development aid. Djankov (2009)
provides more examples and details.
3the reforms were occurring. 2
Our paper contributes to this second stream of research by evaluating the impact of entry
deregulation in Portugal. Prior to 2005 the barriers facing entrepreneurs in Portugal were
among the highest in Western Europe, according to World Bank measures. In 2005 Portugal
implemented the ￿On the Spot Firm￿ program (Empresa na Hora) which established ￿one-
stop shops￿ that o￿ered prospective entrepreneurs signi￿cantly reduced administrative fees,
and simpli￿ed incorporation procedures. The reform reduced the time delay of legal incor-
poration from several months to as little as one hour, and also reduced monetary fees that
initially were on the order of 2000 Euro to less than 400 Euro. Over the next several years,
these o￿ces were opened across the country. As a consequence of this reform, Portugal’s
ranking in the World Bank’s ￿Doing Business Index￿ moved from 113rd out of 155 countries
to 33rd, and Portugal was cited by the World Bank as the top reformer in business entry
regulation in 2005/2006. Portugal thus provides an excellent context in which to evaluate
the impact of substantial entry regulation reform. What e￿ect did this reform have on ￿rm
and job creation? What types of entrepreneurs bene￿ted from this reform? How well did
any new ￿marginal￿ ￿rm entrants perform over time?
To answer our key questions, we use micro-level data and examine the implementation
of the Portuguese business registration reform in di￿erent counties at di￿erent time periods.
Our data provide detailed information on the new ￿rms established in each county between
2000 and 2008. For each ￿rm, we were able to gather information on size, founder charac-
teristics, and ￿rm survival. The fact that adoption of the reform varied across county and
time is helpful for our identi￿cation strategy. The richness of our data allows us to compare
the characteristics of new ￿rms created by the reform to those that emerged prior to its
implementation, providing a dimension of analysis that has been missing in the previous
literature.
We ￿nd that in the short run, the Portuguese reform increased the number of busi-
ness start-ups by approximately 17 percent, and created approximately seven new jobs per
100,000 county inhabitants per month in eligible industries. There is evidence to suggest
that the ￿marginal ￿rms￿￿￿rms that entered as a consequence of reduced entry costs￿were
operated by proprietors who were disproportionately older, more female, and less educated
than proprietors of infra-marginal ￿rms. The marginal ￿rms were typically low-tech, e.g.,
in the agricultural, retail trade, and construction industries. We also ￿nd that start-ups
established after the program are smaller and less likely to survive in the ￿rst two years
than ￿rms founded in the absence of the program. Taken together, these results suggest
that entry deregulation has had a modest positive impact on ￿rm and job creation in Portu-
gal. The barriers that existed prior to deregulation were a signi￿cant impediment for some
entrepreneurs, but less of an impediment to the larger, high-quality ￿rms that are most
likely to create substantial economic growth. These lessons are likely to extend beyond the
Portuguese context of this study, and suggest that the ultimate impact of business entry
deregulation may fall somewhat short of current expectations.
2See also Chari (2007) on the License Raj. Other relevant examples include analyses of Russian reform
(Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 2007) and entry regulation reform in Mexico (Kaplan et al., 2009; Bruhn, 2008)
and Brazil (Monteiro and Assun￿ªo, 2006).
4The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide a brief
overview of the literature on entry regulation. Section 3 develops a simple model for the
purpose of highlighting expected the e￿ects of entry deregulation on entrepreneurial out-
comes. Section 4 describes the Portuguese business simpli￿cation reform in further detail. A
description of the data follows in section 5. In section 6, we present the empirical strategy,
results and robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Entry Regulation: Theory and Existing Evidence
Two contrasting theoretical views of entry regulation have long been debated: ￿public choice￿
and ￿public interest￿ theories. The ￿rst regards regulation as socially ine￿cient, and as a
mechanism to create and extract rents. This view holds that regulation either bene￿ts
bureaucrats and politicians by collecting bribes from entrants (De Soto, 1989) or bene￿ts
incumbent ￿rms by deterring the competition of potential entrants (Posner, 1975; Peltzman,
1976; Stigler, 1971). In contrast, public interest theory provides a potential rationale for
entry barriers: regulation might help correct market failures and achieve socially superior
outcomes (Pigou, 1938), for example, screen new ￿rms, thereby reducing low-quality products
or damaging externalities.
Recent empirical evidence does not appear to square with public interest theory. Many
papers, some of which we have cited above, suggest that entry regulation indeed has the ex-
pected ￿rst-order e￿ect of reducing ￿rm entry and a￿ecting the market structure. 3 Djankov
(2008), among others, argue that the main bene￿ciaries of complex entry regulation are
often incumbent ￿rms, which see their rents and competitive position protected by burden-
some entry requirements. Considerable e￿ort has also been devoted to studying the link
between regulation and macro-economic outcomes such as employment, productivity and
growth (Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002; Alesina et al., 2005; Djankov et al., 2006; Yakovlev
and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Chari, 2007; Kaplan et al., 2009; Aghion et al., 2008; Barseghyan,
2008; Bruhn, 2008). Stricter regulation is linked to slower growth, lessened productivity,
inhibited investment and decreased employment (particularly in high-skilled jobs, according
to Barseghyan (2008)). Some evidence suggests that entry regulation induces business to
operate in the informal sector (Djankov et al., 2002; Monteiro and Assun￿ªo, 2006).
In an e￿ort to take seriously the concerns raised by public interest theory, some work
focuses on the impact of regulation on market failures such as sub-standard product quality,
pollution or public health (Djankov et al., 2002; Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Bruhn,
2008). Most work along these lines ￿nds no evidence of bene￿cial e￿ects of entry regulation.
As we have mentioned, much of the existing work relies on cross-national variation.
Causal inference here is di￿cult. For example, governments might regulate more heavily
in countries where there are more market failures, or regulators might focus e￿ort on rent
extraction in countries where such extraction is made possible by other structural de￿cits
in governance. Omitted variables can jointly drive economic outcomes and regulation. One
3See, e.g., Djankov et al. (2002); Bertrand and Kramarz (2002); Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004);
Klapper et al. (2006); Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007).
5potential path is to search for instruments that drive regulation decisions, 4 or to draw lessons
from such speci￿c quasi-experiments as German reuni￿cation (Prantl and Spitz-Oener, 2009)
or reform in Russia (Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 2007).
While useful, these approaches are not a substitute for empirical evaluations of actual
policy shifts that change entry regulation. There are two reasons why our examination of
the Portuguese policy shift holds particular promise. First, the policy shift was quite simple
and, as we discuss below, dramatic. Second, we have access to extraordinary panel data on
￿rms, their employees, and their founders. Thus, in comparison to the extant literature, we
are able to evaluate the impact on ￿rm entry and job growth, and also the kinds of start-ups
and entrepreneurs that appeared to bene￿t from deregulation. Previous empirical work has
suggested that entry regulation results in increased ￿rm size (Desai et al., 2003; Fisman and
Sarria-Allende, 2004; Klapper et al., 2006). Beyond that, little is known about the nature
and quality of the ￿rms that can be expected to enter when governments adopt deregulation.
This is a signi￿cant gap in the literature because the social impact of deregulation will be a
function not only of the number of new ￿rms brought into the market, but also their quality,
size, performance, and longevity.
3 A Simple Model
To ￿x ideas, and set the stage for the empirical analysis that follows, we develop a simple
model here that draws on the logic given in the seminal work of Lucas (1978).
We evaluate an economy in which agents can choose between three options in each
period: (i) home production (or leisure), which provides monetized utility w, (ii) supplying
one unit work in a competitive labor market, or (iii) becoming an entrepreneur and hiring
other agents. In equilibrium, agents are indi￿erent between the ￿rst two possibilities, and
we assume that there are some agents in each of the two possible categories. So to induce
agents to supply labor, the labor market must pay wage w.5 Agents pursue entrepreneurship
when the expected rewards equal or exceed w.
We assume, as does Lucas (1978), that our economy is populated by individuals who have
identical abilities as workers, but who are endowed with di￿erent levels of entrepreneurial
ability, , drawn from a continuous probability distribution g(); with support [l;u]. En-
trepreneurial ability is a unique scarce resource (as in Schumpeter (1934)), which allows
individuals to create and manage ￿rms e￿ectively.
To make matters interesting, we introduce a dynamic element by allowing agents to live
for two periods. In the ￿rst period, an agent with endowment  can choose home production
4For example, a country’s legal and political origin is often treated as an instrument in this literature
(Fisman and Sarria-Allende, 2004; Djankov et al., 2006; Dulleck et al., 2006; Barseghyan, 2008).
5Our assumptions imply that labor supply is perfectly elastic. This is a particularly transparent case for
analysis. We might alternatively have chosen to analyze the equally transparent case of perfectly inelastic
labor supply, as does Lucas (1978) However, that case rules out (by assumption) an interesting question
we want to examine: Does entry regulation a￿ect equilibrium employment? The intermediate case, with
upward-sloping supply, adds considerable complication with no additional insight, so we do not pursue it
here.
6or work, in which case the payo￿ is w. Alternatively, she can become an entrepreneur, and
receive a payo￿ 1() that is a known function of her entrepreneurial ability plus a mean-
zero term, say  (drawn from a known distribution), that re￿ects uncertainty that cannot
be resolved until a potential entrepreneur actually opens her ￿rm.To keep analysis simple,
we let the value created by a ￿rm take a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas form in





2   (wL + F) + ; (1)
where L is the quantity of labor employed, and F is a ￿xed cost to opening the ￿rm. In
the second period, the agent retains her (now revealed) idiosyncratic term  but faces no





2   wL + ; (2)
if she continues to operate. If, instead, our entrepreneur closes her ￿rm (as she might if she
has a particularly poor  draw), she earns w.
Given this set up, it is easy to verify that an optimizing entrepreneur with ability  and









4w +  if   w   
4w; and
w if   w   
4w:
(4)
Clearly, the value of operating as an entrepreneur depends on one’s ability ; relative to
the market wage w. Importantly for our purposes, the value of entrepreneurship depends
also on the level of the ￿xed cost F, and so too, therefore, does the decision to become an
entrepreneur. To illustrate, let  be drawn from a uniform distribution with support [ u;u].
Then with a bit of algebra it is easy to con￿rm that a risk-neutral agent will choose to open
















(assuming a zero rate of time discounting). Expression (5) makes sense. The ￿rst bracketed
term on the left-hand side is expected pure pro￿t from operating in the ￿rst period. In a
one-period model, the entrepreneurship decision would hinge solely on whether this term was
as large as the ￿xed entry cost. There is an option value, though, associated with continued
operation in the second period, and this is represented by the second, strictly positive, term
on the left-hand side of (5).
Let ^  be the value of  that solves (5) with equality. Then the fraction of agents who
become entrepreneurs is 1   G(^ ); where G( ) is the c.d.f. for g( ). Inspection of (5) gives
the intuitive result that ^  is strictly increasing in F; the lower the entry cost, the lower is
the threshold that induces agents to open ￿rms. In turn, the lower the entry cost, the higher
will be the fraction of agents who become entrepreneurs.
6As part of our e￿ort to keep things clear, we have no capital here.
7Labor market employment in our economy of course depends on the level of entrepreneur-
ship. In particular, an entrepreneur with ability  employs =4w2 workers in period 1, and
employs that same number in period 2 if she continues operation. So in our economy, a
decrease in F increases employment (while decreasing the number of agents in home produc-
tion). Notice that the ￿rms that form as a consequence of a reduction in F will be operated
by proprietors with relatively low levels of ; and these ￿rms will tend to be small, since
labor demand is proportional here to entrepreneurial ability .
Finally, we note that the probability of ￿rm survival in period 2 is also related to . In











Firms with high-ability proprietors (which are also ￿rms with relatively more employees
here) have a higher survival rate. Given that the distribution of talent among operating















1   G(^ )
d; (7)











A reduction in F results in a reduction in the cut-o￿ ^ ; and this in turn reduces the mean
ability level of entrepreneurs. The consequence is to reduce average ￿rm survival.
To summarize, our model provides an intuitive set of predictions about the consequence
of a reduction in the cost of ￿rm entry, i.e., a reform of the sort enacted in Portugal:
1. Increased business formation: A higher proportion of agents become entrepreneurs.
2. Increased employment: A higher proportion of agents are employed; fewer are in
home production.
3. All shifts occur at the margin: New ￿rms will generally have entrepreneurs with
relatively lower talent. These ￿rms will generally be smaller, and will have lower survival
probabilities than infra-marginal ￿rms.
It is worth noting that our model has some predictions that di￿er in the short- and
long-run. For example, in our set-up only young agents form ￿rms, because only they can
take advantage of the option value of continued operation in case the ￿rm proves to be
particularly successful.7 A short-run consequence of reduced entry cost would be to cause
some older entrepreneurs to form new ￿rms. These would be agents who were deterred by
high entry costs when they were young, but now ￿nd entrepreneurship to be more attractive.
So in the short run, the average age of new entrepreneurs rises. In the long run, though,
7In a more complete model, the relationship between age and entrepreneurship becomes more complicated.
Experience can increase ability, but agents still face the need to recoup the ￿xed costs of starting a ￿rm over
a sustained period of operation, making entrepreneurship less attractive for older workers.
8once again only young agents form ￿rms.
Finally, we note that in our model arti￿cial barriers that increase entry costs introduce
ine￿ciency; these regulations induce some potential entrepreneurs to unnecessarily and in-
e￿ciently decide to work for others or remain out of the labor force. Empirical support of
the model’s key predictions thus constitutes some useful prima facia evidence in favor of the
proposition that reduced entry regulation is socially useful. If, to the contrary, one were to
show little impact of entry deregulation, there would be less reason to be concerned about
entry regulation as a practical concern. Conceivably, one might even ￿nd that reduced entry
regulation reduces employment if markets are non-competitive. 8
4 The ￿On the Spot Firm￿ Program
In this section, we describe the Portuguese business registration reform and the setting in
which it was implemented.
Prior to 2005, to meet the government requirements, an entrepreneur had to visit several
di￿erent public agencies, complete 11 procedures, ￿ll out 20 forms and documents, wait
between 54 and 78 days and pay almost 2,000 Euro (approximately 13.5 percent of per
capita gross national income). These numbers were high by international standards, making
Portugal one of the least attractive countries in which to start a business. 9 Pressure to
reform this system increased as the country’s economic performance deteriorated after 2000.
Between 1996 and 2000, the economy had experienced a period of reasonably good growth
(real GDP increased by approximately 4.0 percent annually), but from 2001 to 2005 growth
fell to less than 1.0 percent.
In response to the poor administrative record, and weak economic performance, the
new government elected in February 2005 decided to rethink the regulatory regime. In
May 2005 a cross-departmental task force, the O￿ce of Public Services and Reform, or
Unidade de Coordena￿ªo da Modernazi￿ªo Administrativa (UCMA), was created to oversee
modernization and simpli￿cation of public services. One of the ￿rst issues tackled by this
o￿ce was the simpli￿cation of the process of starting a business. As a result, the UCMA
implemented the ￿On the Spot Firm￿ program, or Empresa na Hora (ENH), with the goal
of decreasing the time, cost and complexity of starting a business.
The program allows the registration of single-shareholder companies, private limited
companies, partnerships or public limited companies in a single o￿ce, the one-stop shop.
However, it does not apply to governmental ￿rms or ￿rms involved in industries which
require special authorization, permits or industry-speci￿c requirements. 10 Within one hour,
an entrepreneur receives a corporate taxpayer number, social security number, commercial
8See, e.g., Mankiw and Whinston (1986) for a general discussion of free entry and social e￿ciency.
9For example, in 2005 a member country OECD required on average 6.5 procedures and 19.5 days, costing
approximately 6.8 percent of the GNI per capita (World Bank, 2006). Djankov et al. (2002) present similar
￿gures. In 2005 Portugal ranked 113 out of 155 countries in the Doing Business Ranking (World Bank,
2006), and if we consider only the waiting time to complete the registration procedures, it ranked 74 out of
85 countries studied by Djankov et al. (2002).
10Appendix A.1 lists all the industries that have to be registered by traditional procedures. The non-eligible
9registration, and declaration of business initiation. In order to increase the e￿ciency of
the process, the UCMA developed standardized pre-approved articles of association, created
lists of pre-de￿ned ￿rm names, and eliminated outdated start-up formalities such as the
registration of company books and the legal obligation to provide public deeds.
The law for this administrative model was approved July 6, 2005 (with Decreto-Lei
111/2005 ), and at the same time six one-stop shops were piloted in four di￿erent counties,
Coimbra, Aveiro, Moita and Barreiro. The shops generally took advantage of preexisting
Trade Registry O￿ces and Business Formalities Centers by locating the shops in these fa-
cilities. Due to resource constraints, the program was not implemented simultaneously in
all counties. Rather, over time the program expanded to other locations across the country.
Table 1 presents the statistics on the timing and geographic variation of program adoption
from 2005 to 2009.
There was some resistance against the adoption of the program, particularly from the
Association of Notaries, which in 2007 threatened to take the ￿On the Spot Firm￿ program
to court, but these e￿orts did not slow the program’s expansion. By the end of 2009, there
were 164 one-stop shops located in 135 di￿erent counties (44 per cent of total counties). 11
Although, the location of these shops are fairly dispersed throughout Portugal, the program
targeted larger and economically important counties. At the same time that the program was
implemented, Portugal had local elections for county chief executives. Political a￿liation
does not seem to play a signi￿cant role in program adoption. 12
Because of the ￿On the Spot Firm￿ program, Portugal was considered the top reformer
in business entry in 2005￿2006, and was rewarded with the European Enterprise Award in
the Red Tape Reducing category by the European Commission. 13 Portugal’s position on
the international competitive rankings improved markedly, e.g., improving from the 74th to
40th percentile in the World Bank Red Tape Percentile Index, and rising to 33rd out of 155
countries in the annual Doing Business Ranking. Figure 1 compares the number and time
of the procedures needed to register a ￿rm before and after the introduction of the one-stop
shop. After the reform, an entrepreneur could easily ￿nish the registration process in one
day, at a cost of approximately 360 Euro. 14
Two features of the program and institutional environment deserve additional discussion.
First, at the end of 2008 there were three concurrent procedures to register a ￿rm: traditional
procedures, the ￿On the Spot Firm￿ program, and an online company incorporation ( Empresa
Online).15 However, the online company registration was initially only accessible to lawyers,
industries are mainly in the ￿nance, insurance and transportation sector.
11Portugal is subdivided into 308 counties, which are approximately one quarter of the size of U.S. counties.
12Approximately 40 percent of the counties with one-stop shops had a chief executive that was from the
government’s party (PS) or from the main opposition party (PSD).
13World Bank (2006), for example, noted the changes: ￿In Portugal, now one of the fastest economies
for start-up, an entrepreneur using the new fast-track service simply chooses a pre-approved name from the
registry’s website then goes to the one-stop shop to register the company," (p. 9).
14The total cost is 360 Euro or 300 Euro if the company’s focus is information technology or research and
development.
15This latter program was the result of an initiative from June 2006, in which the government launched a
special regime for setting up companies via the Internet (Decreto-Lei 125/2006 ), with similar steps as the
￿On the Spot Firm￿ program.
10solicitors and notaries with a digital certi￿cation, and subsequently it only became available
to individuals with the citizens card (cartªo do cidadªo) and electronic certi￿cation in the
last trimester of 2009.16 Our data do not include information on the type of procedure used
by entrepreneurs to register their ￿rms. However, according to o￿cial information, more
than 70 percent of new ￿rms were established through the ￿On the Spot Firm￿ program
until 2008. Traditional procedures and on-line registration were used much less frequently
because of the cost and time of the former and the unavailability of the latter. Second,
any individual or ￿rm, anywhere in Portugal or abroad, can establish a ￿rm in any one-
stop shop, regardless of the location of the company’s headquarters. Although ￿rms are
allowed to register in one county and operate in another, this is not the usual procedure, and
discussions with government o￿cials strongly suggested that the fraction of ￿rms registering
outside their county of operation was trivially small. In short, over the time period we study,
2000-2008, there was considerable variation across regions and time in business registration
costs and procedures. We will exploit this variation in policy using the rich data described
below.
5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data for our empirical analysis come from an extraordinary matched employer-employee
dataset (Quadros de Pessoal or SISED - Sistema de Informa￿ªo de SalÆrios, Emprego e Du-
ra￿ªo do Trabalho), built using a mandatory survey submitted annually by ￿rms with at least
one employee to the Portuguese Ministry of Employment and Social Security. These data
include information on an average of 227,000 ￿rms and two million individuals per year, cov-
ering virtually all employees and ￿rms in the Portuguese private sector. As individuals and
￿rms are cross-referenced by a unique identi￿er, the data make it possible to match founders
with their ￿rms characteristics. Each year, ￿rms report their year of constitution, location,
industry classi￿cation, number of employees, number of establishments, initial capital, and
ownership structure. At the individual level, the data provide information on gender, age,
date of hire, education, occupation, working hours, and earnings.
We supplement these data with information from other sources. Information on the
opening date of each one-stop shop was obtained from the Institute of Registration and
Notarization (Instituto dos Registos e do Notariado) at the Ministry of Justice. 17 County-
level data on inhabitants, gross domestic product, and an industrial production index are
from the National Statistic O￿ce.
Our matched employer-employee data includes 177,595 start-ups established in eligible
industries for which we have a precise founding date that lies between 2000 and 2008. We use
these ￿rms and their characteristics to study the impact of the ￿On the Spot Firm￿ program
on ￿rm entry and job creation. For these new ￿rms, we identify the founders and their
16The citizens card is a non-mandatory document, introduced in February 2007 ( Lei 7/2007) with the goal
of allowing individuals to identify themselves when dealing with computerized services and to authenticate
electronic documents.
17The complete list of counties with an one-stop shop by December 2009 and their respective opening date
is provided in Appendix A.2.
11background history. We exclude ￿rms for which we could not identify at least one owner or
the background history of the founder. 18 We also restrict the sample to founders with age
between 20 and 60. In total, we ended up with 139,868 founders of 94,586 new ￿rms. This
entrepreneurs sample is used to evaluate the impact of the program on ￿rm survival.
In addition, we draw a 30 percent random sample of all individuals who were employees
in eligible ￿rms between the period of 2000 and 2008, 19 within the same age range (20 to
60) and with known labor market histories. Then we merge the latter sample with the
entrepreneurs sample. This allows us to compare characteristics of ￿rm founders and non-
founders in speci￿c years. In total, we then have a sample of 5,071,627 individuals, of whom
33,958 are entrepreneurs. These data allow us to evaluate the impact of the program on the
decision to become an entrepreneur.
Our basic empirical strategy, discussed below, is to compare county-level economic out-
comes before and after the introduction of the one-stop shops. Table 2 provides various
descriptive statistics for such counties. In ￿rst column we give statistics for the 12 months
prior to the opening of the one-stop shop, in the second column we provide statistics for the
12 months after the opening, and the third column we record the di￿erence. In general, the
opening of a one-stop shop is associated with an increase in number of ￿rms and jobs created
(though this increase is statistically signi￿cant only in the former case). Firms established
after the program introduction have fewer employees, and low subsequent probability of sur-
viving in the ￿rst two years. In terms of the founder characteristics, after the program is
introduced entrepreneurs are less likely to be male, are slightly older, and are less experienced
(though the changes in the ￿rst two features are not statistically signi￿cant). To make the
later point, we focused on two categories of entrepreneurs: ￿novice entrepreneurs,￿ who have
not previously established a ￿rm, but who do have previous labor experience, and ￿habitual
entrepreneurs,￿ who have both previous entrepreneurial and labor experience. We notice
that after the opening of one-stop shops, there is a three percent increase in the proportion
of novice entrepreneurs and a two percent decline in habitual entrepreneurs.
6 Empirical Methodology and Results
In this section we present estimates of the impact of the Portuguese reform on entrepreneurial
outcomes￿entry, job creation, ￿rm size and survival￿using a simple di￿erences-in-di￿erences
approach. Eligible ￿rms and individuals in counties with one-stop shops constitute the ￿treat-
ment group,￿ which is compared to a ￿control group￿ with no one-stop shop. More precisely,
we estimate regressions in which the outcome variable of interest is estimated as a function
of indicator variables that measure seasonal e￿ects, county-time ￿xed e￿ects, and of course
our key indicator variable that equals one when the reform takes place within a county.
Our identi￿cation strategy relies, of course, on an assumption that the program is not being
18For the employees, the data include some cases in which the record changes in gender and year of birth.
We consider observations with multiple changes in the gender or year of birth to be errors, corresponding to
individuals whose identi￿cation number was not recorded, or wrongly identi￿ed by the respondent. We drop
individuals whose gender and year birth change in more than 70 percent of the total number of observations.
19We exclude the year 2001 because there are no data available for workers that year.
12rolled out in a way that correlates with pre-existing trends in the dependent variables of
interest. For example, our strategy would give misleading inferences if the one-stop shops
were purposely introduced in locations that initially were experience rapid job growth. We
conduct some analysis below that suggests our assumption is credible. As an initial check
of this issue, though, we investigated whether ￿early adopting￿ counties (which established
one-stop shops between July 2005 and June 2007) di￿ered from ￿late adopting￿ counties
(which established one-stop shops between July 2007 and December 2008) in terms of initial
growth trends (2000 through 2004) of total sales, sales of new ￿rms, number of ￿rms, number
of new ￿rms and purchasing power. We ￿nd no signi￿cant di￿erence between counties.
6.1 Firm Entry and Job Creation
We start by determining the e￿ect of business registration reform on ￿rm entry. Let Ycmy be
the number of newly formed ￿rms per 100,000 inhabitants in county c, month m and year y.









cy + Imy + Zcmy + cmy (9)
where m controls for seasonal e￿ects in ￿rm entry, 20 cy are county/year ￿xed e￿ects, Imy is
a monthly index of industrial production for the country, which further controls for economic
activity, and, Zcmy is the key variable of interest￿an indicator variable that equals one at the
opening month of the one-stop shop and all subsequent months (and zero otherwise). Notice
that because of our inclusions of county/year ￿xed e￿ects, identi￿cation here comes from
comparison of ￿rm entry rates within a particular county in months immediately before
the introduction of the one-stop shop to the ￿rm entry rates in the months immediately
thereafter. Standard errors for this and all subsequent regressions are clustered at the county
level.
Column (1) of Panel A in Table 3 presents estimates. Our theory leads us to expect the
opening of one-stop shops to lead to an increase in ￿rm entry, i.e., that the estimate of 
should be positive. In fact, we ￿nd that the introduction of the one-stop shop is associated
with an increase in the number of new ￿rms per 100,000 inhabitants of approximately two,
which is an approximately 17 percent increase.
Panel B in Table 3 uses the same speci￿cation to examine the impact of the one-stop
shop reform on initial employment. In this case, the dependent variable in (9) is the initial
number of employees of start-ups at the county level (per 100,000 inhabitants). As predicted,
the coe￿cient is positive; we estimate that the reform is associated with an increase in initial
employment in new ￿rms of 7 per 100,000, corresponding to an increase of approximately
22 percent.
As we have mentioned, the key to our identi￿cation strategy is an assumption that
administrative decisions to the open one-stop shops in particular counties and time periods
20As it turns out, entry is generally stronger in the ￿rst three months of a year, slower in the summer,
stronger in early fall, and slower again in November and December.
13are not correlated with existing trends in ￿rm formation or economic growth within counties.










cy + Imy +
11 X
l= 10
lzlc + cmy (10)
where zlc is a set of indicator variables for the 10 months prior to the opening of a one-stop
shop and the 10 months after the opening of the one-stop shop. Thus, for instance, z 1 is
equal to one in the month prior to the opening of the one-stop shop (otherwise 0), while
z1 is equal to one for the month after the opening of the one-stop shop (otherwise 0). The
only exception is z11, which is equal to one for month 11 and for the months that follow.
We set  1 to 0 (i.e., let that be the ￿omitted￿ indicator variable). Figure 2 and 3 plots the
coe￿cients l; for ￿rm entry and employment regressions, respectively.
Consider Figure 2. The coe￿cients on the ￿lags￿ are generally close to 0; using an F
test, we cannot reject the hypotheses that ^  10;:::; ^  1 = 0. This suggests that on average,
in the months leading up to the establishment of the one-stop shop there was no unusual
trend in the establishment of new ￿rms. This, in turn, gives us increased con￿dence in our
identifying strategy. In contrast, in the month of the establishment of the one-stop shop,
and the months that follow, we have positive and statistically signi￿cant coe￿cients, which
we expect, given the estimates from our baseline regression (9). Our F test easily rejects the
null hypothesis that these coe￿cients jointly equal 0. Figure 3 shows comparable results for
our analysis of employment at newly established ￿rms.
Some counties have more than one one-stop shop by the end of the sample period. We
￿nd that our results (here and in other speci￿cations) do not qualitatively change when we
exclude these counties from the "treatment" group. Another concern is that entrepreneurs
in counties that border another county with a one-stop shop might cross borders to register
in the other county, then operate in the county of residence of the entrepreneur. This would
lead us to underestimate the causal e￿ect of the one-stop shop on observed e￿ects, because
some one-stop shops would "treat" individuals in the "control" counties. Conversations with
o￿cials in the one-stop shop program indicated that it was very rare for entrepreneurs to
register in a county other than their county of operation. We experimented with aggregat-
ing counties where this border-crossing was more likely, and these alternative speci￿cations
produce stronger results than those reported here.
6.2 Firm Characteristics
Our theory leads us to believe that any impact of the reform￿the establishment of the
one-stop shops￿should be found in ￿marginal ￿rms,￿ which in our theory are also small
￿rms. So we estimate our key regression (9) but for ￿rms categorized by the ￿rm’s initial
size. Columns (2) to (5) of Panel A in Table 3 report the coe￿cient when we consider the
number of ￿rms with one, two, three to ￿ve, and more than ￿ve employees, respectively. Our
estimates indicate statistically signi￿cant increases in the number of newly established ￿rms
with two employees, and three to ￿ve employees, but no statistically signi￿cant increase in
larger ￿rms.
14Next, the number of new ￿rms is broken down into ten sectors: agriculture, construction,
high-technology industries, low technology industries, utilities, wholesale retail, retail trade,
services and communities.21 Table 4 presents the results for this analysis, again using (9).
The estimated positive impact of the reform is found to operate in three sectors: agriculture,
construction and retail trade.
6.3 Firm Survival
As we mention in our paper’s introduction, a distinctive feature of our data is the ability to
examine the impact of the reform on the survival of newly-formed ￿rms. Our approach is
to examine the two-year survival rate, in which Siflcmy is ￿rm survival for founder i in ￿rm
f, industry l, county c, month m and year y. This dependent variable is 1 if the start-up is













l + !Sf + Xi + Zcmy + Imy + iflcmy; (11)
where again we have indicators for month, year-county ￿xed e￿ects, and now also two-digit
industry ￿xed e￿ects for 29 categories l: We also have a variable that gives the ￿rm’s initial
size, S. We include also a vector founder characteristics X: gender, which equals 1 for men,
0 for women; four indicator variables for the founder’s age, partitioned at 20, 30, 40, and 50;
an ￿industry experience￿ variable which equals 1 for founders that previously work on the
same four-digit industry digit code, 0 otherwise; and education, which is taken to be ￿very
low￿ for those never completing elementary school, ￿low￿ for those that attended junior high
school, ￿medium￿ for those with a high school diploma or equivalent, and ￿high￿ for those
reporting bachelor’s degree or more advanced degree. In reporting the estimated coe￿cients,
our omitted categories are founders aged 20￿29 and with ￿very low￿ education.
Table 5 gives estimates. We notice that in general start-up ￿rm survival is higher for ini-
tially larger ￿rms, and for ￿rms founded by experienced individuals, by men (in comparison
to women), by relatively older individuals, and by relatively well educated individuals. Im-
portantly, there is a substantial estimated impact associated with the one-stop shop program.
In comparison with other start-ups, ￿rms established in the months after the availability of
the one-stop shop program had two year survival rates that are approximately four percent-
age points lower.
21We use the de￿nition of OECD (2002) to divide ￿rms into high-technology and low-technology industries.
￿High-technology industries￿ include the following sectors: pharmaceuticals, o￿ce and computing machinery,
radio, TV and communication equipment, medical, precision and optical equipment, aircraft and spacecraft,
chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals, machinery and equipment, electrical machinery and apparatus, motor
vehicles and trailers, railroad and transport equipment. ￿Low-technology industries￿ include coke, re￿ned
petroleum products and nuclear fuel, rubber and plastic products, other non-metallic mineral products,
basic metals, fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment, building and repairing ships and
boats, food products, beverage and tobacco, textile and textile products, leather and footwear, wood, pulp,
paper products, printing and publishing, and recycling. We acknowledge that this is a rough taxonomy; the
low-technology category could include some technologically progressive ￿rms and vice versa.
15As in the analyses presented above, we also estimate the impact of the one-stop shop
program on our survival variable, using estimates for lag and lead months. Figure 4 plots
the coe￿cients on the lag and lead indicator variables, which were constructed using the
same methodology as presented in Section 6.1. As can be seen in Figure 4, the fraction
of surviving start-ups is close to zero before the opening of the one-stop shop and then it
becomes jointly signi￿cantly negative from months 0 to > 10 .
6.4 Entrepreneur Characteristics
In this last section, we explore the e￿ect of the one-stop program by estimating an equation
in which the dependent variable is the probability that any individual in our data founds a
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where Eilcy is an indicator variable that equals 1 if individual i establishes a ￿rm in county c
and year y, and 0 if that individual does not open a ￿rm. We have also control for economic
activity with a measure of gross domestic product (GDP), Gn; for 30 NUTS (￿Nomenclature
of Unit for Territorial Statistics￿) regions de￿ned for Portugal. We include also a vector of
individual characteristics Xi (measures of age, gender, and education). Finally, Zcy is an
indicator variable equal to 1 if there is a one-stop shop in county c in year y for at least part
of the year.22 We remind the reader that these results are based on a 30 percent random
sample of the database in which there are more than ￿ve million individuals, but fewer
than 34,000 of these individuals transition into entrepreneurship. In other words, less than
0.68 percent (0.0068) of the sample starts a new ￿rm; our econometric estimates should be
evaluated in light of this feature of the sample.
The estimates for this speci￿cation are presented in Column (1) of Table 6. Given
results above, we are not surprised that the presence of a one-stop shop is associated with an
increase in the probability an individual becomes an entrepreneur. Given the small fraction
of the sample that ever becomes an entrepreneur, the coe￿cient on the One-Stop Shop
dummy is associated with an marginal increase of about 9.2 percent. As for demographic
and education variables, we can infer that male, middle aged (age between 30 and 39), and
well-educated individuals are relatively more likely to transition into entrepreneurship than
are other individuals.
Our model predicts that entry regulation reform leads to an increase in the entry of
￿marginal entrepreneurs.￿ To evaluate that claim we interact each of the demographic and
educational variables with Zcy (our indicator that the reform has occurred in the county
in that year) and add these interactions to Equation (12). The coe￿cient estimates are
reported in Column (2) of Table 6. These results suggest that the entrepreneurs induced into
the market by the establishment of the one-stop shop are from demographic categories that
were previously least likely to initially be entrepreneurs. Relative to the omitted category
22Our data for this regression is annual, so we cannot look at within-year e￿ects as in the analyses above.
16(very low educated individuals), the fraction of highly educated entrepreneurs decreases by
0.4 percent. Similarly, marginal entrants appear to be older (individuals aged 40￿50 and
50￿60) and are less likely to be male.
These results, combined with the evidence presented above￿that regulation reform is
associated with the entry of ￿rms that are less likely to survive to the two-year mark, provide
some support for the argument that the reduced entry regulation disproportionately induced
marginal, relatively low-ability individuals to establish businesses.
7 Conclusion
This paper uses Portuguese micro-level data to analyze the e￿ects of a program that substan-
tially reduced entry regulation for business. The reform, which introduced one-stop shops in
counties throughout the country, appears to have had meaningful e￿ects on start-up entry,
performance, and survival.
By comparing counties with and without one-stop shops, we ￿nd that the program
increases the number of start-ups in eligible industries by approximately 17.2 percent. This
increase is disproportionately driven by entrepreneurs who are relatively older, more female
and less educated. Based on our estimates, the reform is associated with an increase in seven
new jobs per month per 100,000 inhabitants (a 21.7 percent increase). These jobs are created
primarily in the agricultural, retail trade and construction sectors. We also ￿nd that the
start-ups created in response to the reform are relatively smaller and less likely to survive
in their ￿rst two years than ￿rms founded in the absence of the reform.
We view the results as entirely consistent with the theoretical model of entrepreneurship
set out in this paper. Inspired by the seminal work of Lucas (1978), we show that arti￿cial
entry costs deter entrepreneurship at the margin. Reform, i.e., the reduction of entry costs,
is predicted to a￿ect entrepreneurship and job formation in just the way we in fact observe.
Our results, then, can be seen as broadly consistent with the ￿public choice￿ approach to
entry regulation, which emphasizes the ine￿ciencies associated with entry regulation, and
argues for the relaxation of such regulation.
In the Portuguese case, the reform was substantial. Portugal undertook one of the most
complete and thorough deregulation e￿orts of any country in Western Europe, moving up
80 places in the World Bank’s Doing Business index and winning international accolades
for the government in the process. As it was implemented across the country, this reform
appears to have induced statistically signi￿cant increases in ￿rm formation and job creation.
Having said all that, a more detailed examination of the kind of ￿rms and jobs created
by this reform suggests a more nuanced picture of its e￿ects. The new ￿rms whose entry is
associated with reform are decidedly low-tech, headed by inexperienced entrepreneurs, and
are less likely to survive than ￿rms formed when barriers were higher. Portugal’s high entry
barriers were a signi￿cant impediment to low quality ￿rms and marginal entrepreneurs, but
apparently represented less of an impediment to high quality ￿rms. The overall social gains
resulting from the reform are limited by the quality of the ￿rms it has created, at least so
17far. Reform has brought bene￿ts, but it is hardly the magic bullet some policymakers may
have anticipated.
This conclusion comes with some obvious caveats. We have deliberately adopted a
conservative empirical speci￿cation that attempts to control as completely as possible for
di￿erential trends in ￿rm creation at the county level; the conservative nature of our approach
could bias our estimates downward. In addition, this reform was implemented in a di￿cult
macroeconomic context. Portugal emerged from recession in 2003, but growth since then has
been weak, consumption and investment have remained depressed, and unemployment has
been high. If and when the macroeconomic environment improves, the new administrative
regime could have a stronger e￿ect on ￿rm and job creation than is evidenced by our analysis.
Unfortunately, given the depth of Portugal’s current economic di￿culties, it may be some
time before scholars will be in a position to evaluate this possibility.
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20Figure 1: Start-up Procedures in Portugal, Before and After the ￿On the Spot Firm￿ Program
Note: The registration procedures are lined up sequentially. Business days required to
complete each procedure are measured against the horizontal scale.
21Figure 2: Coe￿cients on the Program Month Dummies for Firm Entry
Note: The ￿gure plots the coe￿cients l from Equation (10), with a dependent variable,
number of ￿rms established in a county per 100,000 inhabitants. Vertical lines are the 95
percent con￿dence intervals for the coe￿cients. The F statistic for pre period is 1.122
(p-value is 0.347); F test statistic for post period is 2.839 (p-value is 0.0011).
22Figure 3: Coe￿cients on the Program Month Dummies for Job Creation
Note: The ￿gure plots the coe￿cients l from Equation (10), with a dependent variable,
number of employees at newly-established ￿rms in a county per 100,000 inhabitants. Vertical
lines are the 95 percent con￿dence intervals for the coe￿cients. The F statistic for pre period
is 1.578 (p-value is 0.121); F test statistic for post period is 2.889 (p-value is 0.0085).
23Figure 4: Coe￿cients on the Program Month Dummies for Two Year Survival
Note: The ￿gure plots the coe￿cients l from Equation (11), with an indicator dependent
variable equal to 1 if the ￿rm survived two years. Vertical lines are the 95 percent con￿dence
intervals for the coe￿cients. The F statistic for pre period is 0.65 (p-value is 0.756); F test
statistic for post period is 3.69 (p-value is less than 0.001).
24Table 1: One-Stop Shop Program Adoption
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Number of shops 20 28 31 36 49 164
Number of counties implementing 13 24 28 34 46 135
Number of counties >1 shop 6 3 1 2 0 12
Note: The following counties have more than one one-stop shop: Aveiro, Braga, Castelo
Branco, Coimbra, Guarda, Leiria, Lisbon, LoulØ, Odivelas, Porto, Setœbal, and Viseu.
25Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Before After Di￿
A. Firm Entry and Job Creation
Number of Firms 191.0 214.7 23.69*
(8.916) (10.89) (14.07)
57 57 114




Size 3.735 3.493 -0.241**
(0.0816) (0.0600) (0.101)
6186 6981 13167




Proportion Male 0.667 0.659 -0.00714
(0.00599) (0.00567) (0.00825)
6186 6981 13167
Average Age 35.82 35.86 0.0375
(0.114) (0.109) (0.158)
6186 6981 13167
Proportion Novice 0.548 0.581 0.0336***
(0.00646) (0.00604) (0.00884)
5943 6668 12611
Proportion Habitual 0.168 0.152 -0.0158**
(0.00485) (0.00439) (0.00654)
5943 6668 12611
Note: The table reports various descriptive statistics for counties that opened one-stop shops
in a 12-month window before the shop opened and a 12-month window after the shop opened.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and the number of observations is presented below.
*** denotes statistical signi￿cance at 1%, ** signi￿cance at 5% , * signi￿cance at 10%.
26Table 3: Impact of ￿On the Spot Firm￿ Program on Entry and Job Creation
Panel A. Firm Entry
All Firms One Employee Two Employees Three to Five More than Five
Employees Employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
One-Stop Shop (Z = 1) 1.999*** 0.544 0.585** 0.611** 0.259
(0.655) (0.426) (0.241) (0.262) (0.212)
Econ. Activity Index 0.156** 0.0327 0.0544*** 0.0541** 0.0152
(0.0755) (0.0285) (0.0108) (0.0228) (0.0194)
Observations 32648 32648 32648 32648 32648
Adjusted R-squared 0.654 0.406 0.346 0.390 0.307




One-Stop Shop (Z = 1) 6.616*
(3.386)




Note: Panel A and B report the estimates of coe￿cients in (9). The dependent variable
is the number of new ￿rms established per 100,000 inhabitants. Columns (2) to (5) conducts
the analysis for ￿rms by initial size. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the number of
employees at start-up ￿rms per 100,000 inhabitants. Month and county-year ￿xed e￿ects are
included but not reported. Standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Table 5: Impact of ￿On the Spot Firm￿ Program on Survival
Two Year Survival
(1)


























Note: The table reports estimated coe￿cients for (11). The dependent variable is two
year survival (1 if the ￿rm survived, 0 if not). Month, county-year, and industry ￿xed e￿ects
(two digit level) are included but not reported. Standard errors clustered at the county
level are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical signi￿cance at 1%, ** signi￿cance at 5% , *
signi￿cance at 10%.
29Table 6: Impact of ￿On the Spot Firm￿ Program on Type of Entrepreneurs
Decision of Becoming an Entrepreneur
(1) (2)




Age 30-39 0.00213*** 0.00204***
(0.000186) (0.000210)
Age 40-49 0.00142*** 0.00126***
(0.000163) (0.000208)
Age 50-60 0.000206 -0.000121
(0.000179) (0.000228)
Low education 0.00240*** 0.00235***
(0.000239) (0.000265)
Medium education 0.00580*** 0.00590***
(0.000629) (0.000594)





















Adjusted R-squared 0.003 0.003
Note: The table reports estimated coe￿cients for (12). The dependent variable equals 1
if the individual is an entrepreneur, 0 otherwise. Year and county ￿xed e￿ects are included
but not reported. Standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses. ***
denotes statistical signi￿cance at 1%, ** signi￿cance at 5%, * signi￿cance at 10%.
30A Appendix
A.1 List of Non-Eligible Industries
Division Non-eligible industries and occupations
Manufacturing Arms and Ammunitions
Transportation and Communication Railroad Transportation












Retail of Arms and Ammunitions
Retail of Electric Energy
Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate Commercial Banks






Services Hotels, Boarding Houses and Spas
Detective and Guard Services
Automobile Inspections
Professional Sports Clubs







Accounting, Auditing, and Bookkeeping Services






31A.2 One-Stop Shop Opening Dates
One-Stop Shop County Openning Date Closing Date
CRC Aveiro Aveiro Jul 14, 2005
CRC Barreiro Barreiro Jul 14, 2005
CRC Coimbra Coimbra Jul 14, 2005
CRC Moita Moita Jul 14, 2005
CFE Aveiro Aveiro Jul 14, 2005
CFE Coimbra Coimbra Jul 14, 2005
CRC Beja Beja Nov 15, 2005
CRC Braga Braga Nov 15, 2005
CRC Bragan￿a Bragan￿a Nov 15, 2005
CRC Guarda Guarda Nov 15, 2005
CRC V.N. Gaia Vila Nova de Gaia Nov 15, 2005
CFE Braga Braga Nov 15, 2005
CRC LoulØ LoulØ Dec 27, 2005
CRC Sintra Sintra Dec 27, 2005
CRC Viseu Viseu Dec 27, 2005
RNPC Lisboa Lisboa Dec 27, 2005
CFE Lisboa I Lisboa Dec 27, 2005 Feb 8, 2008
CFE Lisboa II Lisboa Dec 27, 2005
CFE LoulØ LoulØ Dec 27, 2005
CFE Viseu Viseu Dec 27, 2005
CRC ￿vora ￿vora Jan 27, 2006
CRC Leiria Leiria Jan 27, 2006
CRC SantarØm SantarØm Jan 27, 2006 Jan 20, 2009
CRC Viana do Castelo Viana do Castelo Jan 27, 2006
CFE Leiria Leiria Jan 27, 2006
CRC Castelo Branco Castelo Branco Feb 24, 2006
CRC Portalegre Portalegre Feb 24, 2006
CRC Setœbal Setœbal Feb 24, 2006
CRC Vila Real Vila Real Feb 24, 2006
CFE Setœbal Setœbal Feb 24, 2006
CRC Porto Porto Mar 31, 2006
CFE Porto Porto Mar 31, 2006
CFE Funchal Funchal Apr 11, 2006
CRC Gondomar Gondomar Apr 28, 2006
CRC Ponta Delgada Ponta Delgada Apr 28, 2006
CRC Faro Faro May 31, 2006
CRC Angra do Hero￿smo Angra do Hero￿smo Jun 1, 2006
CRC Maia Maia Jun 1, 2006
1aCRPC Guimarªes Guimarªes Sep 29, 2006
CRPC Sªo Joªo da Madeira Sªo Joªo da Madeira Sep 29, 2006
CRPC Bombarral Bombarral Oct 31, 2006
CRC Lisboa Lisboa Oct 31, 2006
CRPC Odivelas Odivelas Oct 31, 2006
CRPC Vila Franca de Xira Vila Franca de Xira Oct 31, 2006
CRC Cascais Cascais Nov 30, 2006
32One-Stop Shop County Openning Date Closing Date
CRPC Portimªo Portimªo Nov 30, 2006
CRPC Chaves Chaves Nov 30, 2006
CRPC V.N. de Cerveira Vila Nova de Cerveira Dec 4, 2006
CRCPC Celorico de Basto Celorico de Basto Mar 30, 2007
CRCPC Gr￿ndola Gr￿ndola Mar 30, 2007
CRPC Lamego Lamego Mar 30, 2007
CRPC Vila do Conde Vila do Conde Mar 30, 2007
CRPC Covilhª Covilhª Apr 30, 2007
CRCPC Estremoz Estremoz Apr 30, 2007
CRCPC Mon￿ªo Mon￿ªo Apr 30, 2007
CRPC V.N. Famalicªo Vila Nova de Famalicªo Apr 30, 2007
CRPC `gueda `gueda May 31, 2007
CRPC Elvas Elvas May 31, 2007
CRCPC Seia Seia May 31, 2007
CRPC Torres Vedras Torres Vedras May 31, 2007
CRCPC AlcÆcer do Sal AlcÆcer do Sal Jun 29, 2007
CRPC Figueira da Foz Figueira da Foz Jun 29, 2007
CRPC Santiago do CacØm Santiago do CacØm Jun 29, 2007
CRCPC V.R. Santo Ant￿nio Vila Real de Santo Ant￿nio Jun 29, 2007
Postos dos Registos Lisboa Jul 6, 2007
CRPC Mirandela Mirandela Sep 27, 2007
CRCPC Oliveira do Bairro Oliveira do Bairro Sep 28, 2007
CRCPC Sertª Sertª Sep 28, 2007
CRCPC Vila Nova de Foz C￿a Vila Nova de Foz C￿a Sep 28, 2007
CRCPC Fornos de Algodres Fornos de Algodres Oct 31, 2007
CRPC Pombal Pombal Oct 31, 2007
CRPC Tomar Tomar Oct 31, 2007
1oCNCE Porto Porto Oct 31, 2007
CRPC Horta Horta Nov 30, 2007
CRPC Abrantes Abrantes Nov 30, 2007
CRPC Caldas da Rainha Caldas da Rainha Nov 30, 2007
CRPC Lagos Lagos Nov 30, 2007
CRPC Montemor-O-Novo Montemor-O-Novo Nov 30, 2007
Loja do Cidadªo Odivelas Odivelas Dec 17, 2007
CRCPC Aljustrel Aljustrel Jan 31, 2008
CRCPC Fafe Fafe Jan 31, 2008
CRPC Valongo Valongo Jan 31, 2008
1aCRC Loures Loures Feb 29, 2008
CRC Espinho Espinho Feb 29, 2008
CRC Oliveira de AzemØis Oliveira de AzemØis Feb 29, 2008
CRC Tondela Tondela Feb 29, 2008
1aCRC Almada Almada Mar 31, 2008
CRC Figueira de Castelo Rodrigo Figueira de Castelo Rodrigo Mar 31, 2008
CRC Idanha-A-Nova Idanha-A-Nova Mar 31, 2008
CRC Moimenta da Beira Moimenta da Beira Mar 31, 2008
CRC Aljezur Aljezur Apr 30, 2008
CRC Almeida Almeida Apr 30, 2008
1oCNCE Castelo Branco Castelo Branco Apr 30, 2008
CRC Vila Verde Vila Verde Apr 30, 2008
CRC Alf￿ndega da FØ Alf￿ndega da FØ May 30, 2008
CRC Macedo de Cavaleiros Macedo de Cavaleiros May 30, 2008
CRC Odemira Odemira May 30, 2008
CRC Ovar Ovar May 30, 2008
CRC ˝lhavo ˝lhavo Jun 30, 2008
CRC Sªo Joªo da Pesqueira Sªo Joªo da Pesqueira Jun 30, 2008
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1aCNCE. Guarda Guarda Jun 30, 2008
1aCNCE Matosinhos Matosinhos Jun 30, 2008
CRC Alcoba￿a Alcoba￿a Sep 30, 2008
CRC Felgueiras Felgueiras Sep 30, 2008
CRC Mora Mora Sep 30, 2008
CRC Valen￿a Valen￿a Sep 30, 2008
CRC ￿bidos ￿bidos Oct 31, 2008
CRC Ponte da Barca Ponte da Barca Oct 31, 2008
CRC Ponte de Lima Ponte de Lima Oct 31, 2008
CRC Trofa Trofa Oct 31, 2008
CRC Cantanhede Cantanhede Nov 28, 2008
CRC Montalegre Montalegre Nov 28, 2008
CRC Moura Moura Nov 28, 2008
CRC Ponte de S￿r Ponte de S￿r Nov 28, 2008
CRC Santo Tirso Santo Tirso Nov 28, 2008
CRP Serpa Serpa Feb 6, 2009
CRP Alcanena Alcanena Feb 20, 2009
CRP Caminha Caminha Feb 20, 2009
CRP Ferreira do ZŒzere Ferreira do ZŒzere Feb 20, 2009
CRP Marco de Canaveses Marco de Canaveses Mar 17, 2009
CRP MortÆgua MortÆgua Mar 17, 2009
CRP Mur￿a Mur￿a Mar 17, 2009
CRP Borba Borba Mar 17, 2009
CNCE de Viseu Viseu Apr 8, 2009
CRP Ferreira do Alentejo Ferreira do Alentejo Apr 8, 2009
CRP Pedrog￿o Grande Pedrog￿o Grande Apr 8, 2009
CRP Valpa￿os Valpa￿os Apr 8, 2009
CRP Pena￿el Pena￿el Apr 8, 2009
CRP Murtosa Murtosa Apr 8, 2009
CRP Arganil Arganil May 4, 2009
CRP Mafra Mafra May 4, 2009
CRP Armamar Armamar May 4, 2009
CRP Arouca Arouca May 4, 2009
CRP Vila Flor Vila Flor May 4, 2009
CRP Azambuja Azambuja May 29, 2009
CRP Cadaval Cadaval May 29, 2009
CRP Sobral de Monte Agra￿o Sobral de Monte Agra￿o May 29, 2009
CRP Resende Resende May 29, 2009
CRP Castanheira de PŒra Castanheira de PŒra Jun 18, 2009
CRP Batalha Batalha Jun 25, 2009
CRP Ourique Ourique Jun 25, 2009
CRP Rio Maior Rio Maior Jun 25, 2009
CRP Barcelos Barcelos Jul 9, 2009
CRP Tavira Tavira Aug 31, 2009
CRP Arruda dos Vinhos Arruda dos Vinhos Sep 7, 2009
CRP Cartaxo Cartaxo Sep 7, 2009
CRP Vimioso Vimioso Sep 7, 2009
CRP Peniche Peniche Sep 7, 2009
CRP Seixal Seixal Sep 7, 2009
CRP Vouzela Vouzela Sep 7, 2009
CRP Campo Maior Campo Maior Sep 7, 2009
CRP Entroncamento Entroncamento Oct 2, 2009
CRP Freixo de Espada Æ Cinta Freixo de Espada Æ Cinta Oct 2, 2009
CRP Marinha Grande Marinha Grande Oct 2, 2009
CRP Oliveira do Hospital Oliveira do Hospital Oct 2, 2009
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CRP Alenquer Alenquer Oct 27, 2009
CRP Lourinhª Lourinhª Oct 27, 2009
CRP NazarØ NazarØ Oct 27, 2009
SIR- Solu￿ıes Integradas de Registo Lisboa Oct 27, 2009
CRP P￿voa de Varzim P￿voa de Varzim Nov 20, 2009
CRP Belmonte Belmonte Nov 20, 2009
CRP Nelas Nelas Nov 20, 2009
CRP Mangualde Mangualde Nov 20, 2009
Espa￿o Registos do Areeiro Lisboa Dec 2, 2009
Note: CFE is Centro de Formalidades de Empresas; CRC is Conservat￿ria do Registo
Comercial; CRP is Conservat￿ria do Registo Perdial; CRCPC is Conservat￿ria do Registo
Civil, Predial e Comercial; CRPC Conservat￿rias do Registo Predial e Comercial; CNCE is
Cart￿rio de CompetŒncia Especializada; RNPC is Registo Nacional de Pessoas Colectivas.
35A.3 Data and Construction of Variables
The data in this paper come from the matched employer- employee dataset (Quadros de
Pessoal or SISED - Sistema de Informa￿ªo de SalÆrios, Emprego e Dura￿ªo do Trabalho),
which is a mandatory survey submitted annually in October by all ￿rms with at least one
employee. This database collects information on an average of 227,000 ￿rms and two million
individuals per year, covering virtually all employees and ￿rms in the Portuguese private
sector.
This database is generally available annually from 1982 onward, however we restrict our
analysis to the period between 2000 and 2008. Data are unavailable for the year 2001.
The database contains three related sets of records: one at the ￿rm level, other at the
establishment level and the last one at the employee level. Employees, ￿rms and estab-
lishments are cross referenced by a unique identi￿er. Each year, ￿rms report their year of
incorporation, location (concelho or county where the main o￿ces are located), main in-
dustry, number of employees, number of establishments, initial capital, ownership structure
and sales. At the establishment level, ￿rms report the number of employees, location, and
main industry. At the individual level, the database contains information on gender, age,
date of hire, education, occupation, working hours, and October’s earnings. However, the
employee records include redundant data or data with frequent changes in gender and/or
year of birth for individual employees. We consider these observations to be errors, corre-
sponding to individuals whose identi￿cation number was not inserted or wrongly identi￿ed
by the respondent. We drop individuals whose gender and year birth change in more than
70 percent of the total number of observations.
From the ￿rm and employee databases, we construct the following variables:
Year of foundation is computed as the minimum of the year of creation reported in
the database, the year that the ￿rm ￿rst appeared in the database and the year of hire of
the ￿rst employee.
Month of foundation is computed as the month of hire of the ￿rst employee when the
year of hire coincides with the year of foundation.
Survival S is an indicator variable equaling one for start-ups that survived their ￿rst
two years. Firms are classi￿ed as non-survivors if they do not appear in the database in
following years. In order to compute the survival rate, we exclude the last two years of the
database (2007 and 2008). Firms can fail to appear in the database, even if they remain
going concerns. For instance, a ￿rm might fail to send the survey in by the due date for two
consecutive years. Using data from previous years, however, we estimate that the probability
of such non-response occurring in two consecutive years is less than one percent.
Size Size is the start-up’s initial number of employees. This measure is computed as
the total number of individuals in the employee records in the foundation year.
Gender Gender is a dummy variable equaling one for men and zero for women.
Age is coded in years in the database. We de￿ne four categorical variables: Age20 29 is
coded one for individuals with age between 20 and 29; Age30 39 is coded one for individuals
36with age between 30 and 39; Age40   49 is coded one for individuals with age between 40
and 49; Age50   60 is coded one for individuals with age between 50 and 60.
Education is measured with four categorical variables: higheducation is a dummy vari-
able equaling one for founders with bachelors, masters or doctoral degrees; mediumeducation
is a dummy variable equaling one for individuals reporting a high school diploma or voca-
tional school degree; loweducation is a dummy variable equaling one for individuals that
attended junior high school; and veryloweducation is a dummy variable equaling one for
individuals who never attended or completed the elementary school.
Industry Experience Ind is coded one for entrepreneurs with experience in the same
industry (four digit level) as that of the ￿rms they found. Industry classi￿cation changed
in 1994 and 2007, and there is no unequivocal relation between the old and new codes. To
mitigate errors, we use all unique relations to translate old to new codes and, vice versa.
Then, we compute the variable industry experience for the new and old codes and aggregate
both results. Alternatively, we also use an algorithm, which is based on how the majority of
￿rms changed industry codes from 1994 to 1995 to translate old into new codes. For 2007,
this problem is mitigated because the database provides information on the new and old
industry classi￿cation.
From the one-stop shop opening dates, we construct the following variables:
One-Stop Shop ENH (month) is a dummy variable equaling one for the month and
county in which the one-stop shop opened, and for all the following months. Counties whose
shops open in the ￿rst 15 days of a month will see the e￿ects of the program in that month.
If the shop opened in the last 15 days of a month, the e￿ect of deregulation will begin in the
following month.
One-Stop Shop ENH (year) is a dummy variable equaling one for the year and county
in which the one-stop shop opened, and for all the following years. Counties whose shops
open in the ￿rst six months of a year will see the e￿ects of the program on that year. If
the shop opened in the last six months of a year, the e￿ect of deregulation will begin in the
following year.
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